Research
Working Papers
Are we doing more harm than good? Hypothetical bias correction techniques in potentially consequential survey settings
Vasudha Chopra, Christian A. Vossler (2024)
Researchers deploying stated preference surveys to elicit monetary valuations for public goods commonly use techniques devised to reduce bias in hypothetical choice settings. This practice is conceptually at odds with accumulated evidence that most survey respondents instead perceive that their decisions have economic consequences (i.e., affect their future welfare). We examine three bias reduction procedures in both hypothetical choice and incentive compatible, real payment settings: cheap talk, solemn oath, and certainty adjustment. While we find that the oath reduces willingness to pay (WTP) in a hypothetical setting, the oath instead increases WTP by over 30% in a consequential setting. Cheap talk does not alter mean WTP in a consequential setting but leads to a stark difference in WTP across sexes. Applying the common rules for ex post adjustment of choices based on stated response certainty leads to significant and large decreases in WTP estimates for both hypothetical and consequential cases. Our results suggest that survey researchers should make use of screening questions to better target hypothetical bias reduction techniques to only those prone to bias.
Works in Progress
The Role of Risk and Power in Compromise: A Social Preferences Perspective
Saumya Deojain, Vasudha Chopra (2025)
In policy decision-making, interest groups often compromise to reduce the risk of an unfavorable policy being implemented. However, compromises involve varying degrees of power (aka influence) over the final policy, shaping an individual's willingness to negotiate with other groups. Power determines how much weight an individual's preferred policy has in shaping the final compromise. If an agent perceives low power in the compromise, they may opt to abandon the compromise and accept the risk of a worse policy being implemented. This suggests that willingness to compromise depends not only on risk aversion but also on perceived power in the compromise process. We propose an experiment where individuals with conflicting policy preferences decide whether to compromise under equal vs. unequal power. If both agree to compromise, a compromise policy is implemented. If even one agent refuses, the alliance dissolves, and each risks their opponent's policy being enacted. Our pilot results reject the hypothesis that unequal power does not affect compromise. Unequal power increases overall instances of compromise by 10.2%, as those with low power choose to compromise more than those with high power opt to fragment. Risk aversion increases compromise by 17%, and risk-averse individuals are 35% more likely to compromise when their opponent holds greater power. Additionally, social preferences—altruism, envy, and inequality aversion—interact with risk aversion, leading to differences in compromise behavior. By linking risk, power, and social preferences, this study contributes to the literature on risk-taking and compromise, offering insights into how behavioral mechanisms and risk attitudes shape willingness to compromise in policy settings.